While existing literature has extensively discussed the strategies employed by economic elites to safeguard their interests, this book takes a fresh approach by considering three primary configurations of relationships between economic elites and political parties. It explores cases where economic elites are the primary constituency of parties they have founded, as well as instances where upper-class interests are predominantly defended outside the party system through mechanisms such as the armed forces, pressure groups, and lobbying. Additionally, it examines scenarios where economic elites align themselves with parties boasting a polyclass constituency, exerting limited influence over these parties.
This book goes beyond traditional analyses by proposing a theory that elucidates how the interaction between elite cohesion and popular sector mobilization determines the specific forms of elite political involvement. It also charts the historical sequences of this process, emphasizing the evolution of the causal relationship over time.
To illustrate this theory, the book employs a comparative historical analysis, scrutinizing the three aforementioned cases to identify factors that account for the different forms of economic elite political participation. It discerns that the level of cohesion among economic elites and the degree of mobilization among popular sectors are pivotal factors shaping elite-party relationships.
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